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X-WR-CALDESC:Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 16.403-1 provides the fol
 lowing description of an FPIF contract but does not provide insight to con
 tractors on how to structure the FPIF pricing arrangement or alter the all
 ocation of cost risk between the contractor and government.\n\nAn FPIF con
 tract specifies a target cost\, a target profit\, a price ceiling (but not
  a profit ceiling or floor)\, and a profit adjustment formula. These eleme
 nts are all negotiated at the outset.\n\nThis webinar provides insight int
 o the mechanics of FPIF contracts and a framework to analyze proposed FPIF
  contract elements and pricing arrangements. Additionally\, Mr. Cuskey wil
 l explain and demonstrate how contractors can alter FPIF pricing arrangeme
 nts to shift greater cost risk onto the government and improve their poten
 tial profitability.\n\nHere is a summary of what you’ll learn:\n\nFactors 
 affecting contract type selection.\nMajor differences between fixed-price 
 and cost-reimbursement contracts and the degree and timing of risk assumed
  by a contractor under various contract types.\nThe criteria for using FPI
 F contracts\, regulatory limitations\, contract elements\, and typical app
 lications in government contracts.\nThe contractor’s performance obligatio
 ns under FPIF contracts.\nHow FPIF profit adjustment formulas and cost-sha
 ring ratios work.\nHow to calculate and shift the FPIF’s Point of Total As
 sumption (PTA).\nHow to calculate the final price and profit based on the 
 FPIF pricing arrangement and the actual costs incurred under the contract.
 \nHow to analyze proposed FPIF pricing arrangements.\nHow a business can a
 lter the FPIF contract elements to produce a more favorable pricing arrang
 ement\, shift more cost risk onto the government and increase their potent
 ial profits.\nWho is the target audience?\n\nNew and seasoned government c
 ontractors who may have developed new products or systems based upon a pro
 totype and are concerned about the risk of performing initial and early pr
 oduction under a Firm-Fixed Price Contract.\nGovernment contractors who wa
 nt to better understand the mechanics of FPIF contracts and how to structu
 re more favorable FPIF pricing arrangements.\n
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DTSTART:20231105T020000
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RDATE:20251102T020000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:88a69bbb-09d1-4b3b-9b0f-29ba89ace54c
DTSTAMP:20260411T223329Z
DESCRIPTION:Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 16.403-1 provides the foll
 owing description of an FPIF contract but does not provide insight to cont
 ractors on how to structure the FPIF pricing arrangement or alter the allo
 cation of cost risk between the contractor and government.\n\nAn FPIF cont
 ract specifies a target cost\, a target profit\, a price ceiling (but not 
 a profit ceiling or floor)\, and a profit adjustment formula. These elemen
 ts are all negotiated at the outset.\n\nThis webinar provides insight into
  the mechanics of FPIF contracts and a framework to analyze proposed FPIF 
 contract elements and pricing arrangements. Additionally\, Mr. Cuskey will
  explain and demonstrate how contractors can alter FPIF pricing arrangemen
 ts to shift greater cost risk onto the government and improve their potent
 ial profitability.\n\nHere is a summary of what you’ll learn:\n\nFactors a
 ffecting contract type selection.\nMajor differences between fixed-price a
 nd cost-reimbursement contracts and the degree and timing of risk assumed 
 by a contractor under various contract types.\nThe criteria for using FPIF
  contracts\, regulatory limitations\, contract elements\, and typical appl
 ications in government contracts.\nThe contractor’s performance obligation
 s under FPIF contracts.\nHow FPIF profit adjustment formulas and cost-shar
 ing ratios work.\nHow to calculate and shift the FPIF’s Point of Total Ass
 umption (PTA).\nHow to calculate the final price and profit based on the F
 PIF pricing arrangement and the actual costs incurred under the contract.
 \nHow to analyze proposed FPIF pricing arrangements.\nHow a business can a
 lter the FPIF contract elements to produce a more favorable pricing arrang
 ement\, shift more cost risk onto the government and increase their potent
 ial profits.\nWho is the target audience?\n\nNew and seasoned government c
 ontractors who may have developed new products or systems based upon a pro
 totype and are concerned about the risk of performing initial and early pr
 oduction under a Firm-Fixed Price Contract.\nGovernment contractors who wa
 nt to better understand the mechanics of FPIF contracts and how to structu
 re more favorable FPIF pricing arrangements.\n
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20240711T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20240711T133000
LOCATION:https://govology.com/product/understanding-the-mechanics-of-fixed-
 price-incentive-firm-target-fpif-contracts/
SUMMARY:Understanding the Mechanics of Fixed-Price Incentive (Firm Target) 
 (FPIF) Contracts (2024 Update)
END:VEVENT
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